Abstract: A major power outage occurred in western North America on August 10, 1996. In this paper we describe simulation of the disturbance using a transient stability program. Initially, the sequence of events was simulated using the standard WSCC dynamic data base, and the simulations did not agree with the disturbance recordings. Several model additions and data modifications were made before the simulations approximated the disturbance recordings. These model changes are discussed in the paper. Table 1 Power flows on major PNWpaths prior to the disturbance.
voltage lines parallel to the Allston-Keeler 500-kV line became loaded up to 115% of their thermal ratings. Voltages in the lower Columbia area were depressed to 508 kV at Hanford, 504 kV at Big Eddy, 510 kV at John Day, and 505 kV at McNary.
About five minutes later, the Merwin-St. Johns 115-kV line tripped due to a relay failure and the overloaded RossLexington 230-IcV sagged into a tree. These lines are parallel to the Allston-Keeler 500-kV line.
About the same time, at 15:47:37, sequential tripping of thirteen McNary units began due to exciter protection malfunctions at high field voltage. This started system power and voltage oscillations (Figure 2 ). For up to 40 seconds on the plot scale, the power oscillations were sustained at near zero damping.
Custer 500-kV lines).
C. The Final Stage before Cascading
Following initial tripping of McNary generators, the system frequency dropped, the CO1 export decreased, and significant BPA area control error developed. Increase in Canadian exports due to governor action was also recorded. The power pick up occurred primarily in the upper Columbia area, further stressing the east of Cascades 500-kV transmission lines, and further depressing Northwest voltages.
Existing converters and parallel Expansion converters, see the Appendix.
PDCI operates in the constant power mode at the pole level. In normal North-to-South operation, both Celilo Expansion and Existing converters are in the current control mode. The Sylmar Expansion converter operates in the mixed (extinction angle -current) control mode, and the Sylmar Existing converter is setting the dc voltage by having the converter extinction angle at its minimum value. Sylmar
Existing converter LTC transformers are adjusted to control the rectifier dc voltage to 500kV.
The PDCI was initially maintaining constant power control ( Figure 6 ). As Celilo ac voltages continued to decay on average, the Existing converters started limiting out (reaching minimum firing angle and losing current control) during the lower portion of the ac voltage swings. During the upper portion of ac voltage swings the converters regained current control. AC voltage oscillations and converter control limits caused the PDCI power oscillations. Due to increased line loading and limited reactive power support from lower Columbia generators, the system voltages continued to decay on average. Figure 5 shows Big Eddy and John Day 500-kV voltages from BPA SCADA (2 second data sampling). The Pacific HVDC Intertie (PDCI) has the four-terminal bi-polar configuration [2] . Each end each consists of Present PDCI controls have a function attempting to maintain dc power constant by transferring current control from a rectifier (Celilo) to an inverter (Sylmar) when a rectifier becomes limited. The mode shift caused by this function contributed to dc power oscillations, resulting in dc power swings below and above the scheduled power. Figure 6 shows: a) CO1 power (same as Figure 2b ), b) total PDCI power at the Celilo converter, c) Celilo Existing converter total power, d) Celilo Expansion converter total power. As the PDCI started participating in the oscillations, the ac system oscillations started picking up in magnitude and the CO1 separation occurred at 15:48:52 (lines relayed due to low voltage high current conditions). The resulting cascading [ 11 is outside the scope of this work. Hz and dampin:; changed to -2.66% (Prony on the interval 35-50 seconds on the plot scale). As the PDCI started participating in the oscillations, the oscillation frequency continued to decrease and the system damping became more negative. At the final stage of the event, the oscillatory frequency was 0.217 Hi with damping of -7.62% (Prony on the interval 72-84 seconds).
D. Analysis of the Oscillations
We computed amplitude and phase of the power oscillations for the COI, Celilo Expansion converter power, Celilo Existing converter power, Celilo total power, Grand Coulee power output, and the British Columbia-Northwest tie power. The complex plane in Figure 7 shows phase relati onship between the specified power oscillations. This phase relationship corresponds to the mode shape for the approximately 0.23 Hz oscillations. Note that the Celilo Expansion and Existing converters had different behavior and impact on the system oscillations. 
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AUGUST lOTH VALIDATION STUDIES
We simulated the disturbance using the EPRI ETMSP program to verify the system dynamic models used in planning and operational studies. First, pre-event power flow conditions were accurately represented using the SCADA data just prior to the RossLexington line outage.
A. Validation Criteria for the Time-Domain Simulations
The main intent of the validation studies was to capture the mechanism and driving forces which led to the system instability. Correct system reinforcements can then be identified and operating practices can be established to prevent similar outages from reoccurring. The system simulations are tested by the following criteria:
1. Frequency and damping of the inter-area oscillatory mode as well as their changes as the disturbance progressed.
2. Change in the PDCI behavior from constant power mode to power oscillations.
3. Average profile of the system voltages, line flows, and system frequency.
4. Distribution of the oscillatory mode in the system (phase shift between power oscillations at the COI, PDCI, Coulee, and British Columbia-PNW ties).
B. Time-Domain Simulations using the WSCC Dynatriic Models and Data
Initially, the August 10th sequence of events was simulated using the standard WSCC dynamic data base. This data base was assembled from dynamic data provided by individual utilities.
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4) Voltage Controls on Lower Columbia generators:
The US Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) operates hydro plants in the Lower Columbia area. The Corps uses Data Acquisition and Control Systems (DACS) for high-side volutge control and balancing of reactive power of the many hydro plant generators. As described above, voltages in the lower Columbia area were depressed for over five minutes follclwing the Allston-Keeler 500-kV line outage. The DACS operate in this time frame to bring the generator reactive power output within unit capability curves. The DACS action is represented at John Day, The Dalles, and Bonneville generators. Action of overexcitation limiters is modeled at McNary generators. Hermiston (near McNary) and Coyote Springs combined-cycle plants were in power factor control, limiting their reactive power support. Reactive power output at Boardman was reduced by operator intervention, so that the plant excitation system is represented by a constant field voltage in the simulations. Representing these voltage controls allowed matching of the recorded and simulated voltages in the lower Columbia area.
5 ) Load Modifications: After all the above system changes were made, the simulated system still showed more damping than the actual system. Load modifications were made to improve the comparison. In WSCC data base, loads in Northwest and Canada are represented by constant current characteristics. On Saturday August loth, area loads were characterized by air conditioning loads in the metropolitan areas and irrigation loads in the rural areas. A combination of induction motors and various static loads were used in the studies.
D. Validation Studies with Modified Dynamic Data
We simulated the August 10th sequence of events using the modified dynamic data base. The comparison between recorded and simulated waveforms is shown on Figures 12-17 (Malin voltages, CO1 power, Grand Coulee frequency, and PDCI power respectively). There is very good agreement between the recorded and simulated quantities. The modified model meets with the validation criteria: 1. The frequency and damping of the inter-area oscillatory mode are computed for the actual and simulated Malin voltages at the beginning and end of the oscillations, and presented in Table 11 . 3. A continuing effort by WSCC utilities is needed to improve dynamic models used in studies of inter-connected power system. The WSCC has a large program underway to verify power plant dynamic data. Development and use of dynamic load models is highly desirable [6] .
Actual Malin Voltage
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4. Based on the validation study results, the BPA has pursued various transmission system reinforcements to improve system reliability. These reinforcements include schemes for fast insertion of series and shunt capacitors, improvement of PDCI dynamic control characteristics, and modulation controls.
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We gratefully acknowledge contributions by many engineers. Richard Bunch (BPA) was our expert on VII. APPENDIX The PDCI connects the Pacific Northwest (Celilo station) with the Los-Angeles area (Sylmar station) by a 1,361km direct current line. The original bi-polar HYDC system was commissioned in 1970 as a +/-400kV,1800A scheme. Each converter consisted of three 133kV mercury arc groups. In 1979, the converter current rating was increased to 2000A. In 1985, the terminals were upgraded to +/-5OOkV by adding a lOOkV thyristor group in series with the existing mercuryarc groups. In 1989, the system was expanded by adding 1100A, +/-5OOkV thyristor converter terminals in parallel with the Existing converters. Presently, the Pacific HVDC intertie is capable of transmitting up to 3100MW in either North-to South or South-to-North directions. A one-line diagram of the present Pacific HVDC intertie configuration is shown in Figure A1 (for one pole). 
Kundur (Powertech Labs Inc.):
The authors are to be complimented for a well written paper describing some important modelling issues in the replication of the August 10, 1996 WSCC system disturbance. However, there are a number of critical issues which are not presented in the paper and which merit discussion.
Standard WSCC Base Model
Fundamental Nature of the Phenomenon
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In determining critical modelling issues, it is essential to understand the fundamental phenomenon causing system instability. It is well known that the WSCC system is prone to lightly damped low frequency interarea oscillations in the frequency range of 0.2-0.3 hz; they have been observed on the system many times. These oscillations are a characteristic of groups of machines oscillating against other groups of machines through weak ties. This is a phenomenon associated with small-signal stability, and is a function primarily of networklgenerator topology and excitation controls; our studies have shown the August 10* event to be of this nature.
Following the Menvin-St. Johns 1 15kv line tripping and the initiation of the dropping of the McNary units, the structure of the WSCC system became such that it exhibited small-signal instability and the 0.28 hz oscillations became very pronounced. Although the actions of HVdc and AGC ultimately had some impact on the system damping and frequency of the system oscillations, they were not the fimdamental cause. This is a conclusion which we have demonstrated by timedomain simulation and further illustrated by eigenvalue analysis [ 13. Using eigenvalue analysis to determine which machines are contributing to the oscillations and which controls are most impactive, simple modifications to the power system stabiliziers (PSS) on just three plants in Southern California can be shown to eliminate the Time in seconds
Figure I : Effut of PSS Modijications on Simulation Results
undamped oscillations completely (see Figure 1 ) and prevent system instability; clearly demonstrating that this is indeed a small-signal stability problem. Also, it is important to note that although system voltages were indeed depressed during the incident, it can be demonstrated that the instability would have occurred even if voltages were much healthier. The impact of capacitor additions on damping is shown in Table 1 .
Critical Modelling Issues
The authors present some interesting work in demonstrating the importance of accurate modelling of HVdc, AGC, turbine speed controls, and generator voltage controls in matching certain simulated quantities (such as frequency) to recorded responses. However, the authors have failed to show their relative importance in affecting the stability of the system. Our analysis has shown that by far the two most critical modelling elements in reproducing this oscillatory disturbance are load characteristics and generator excitation controls.
Both are relatively uncertain (particularly load) and changes to either can profoundly change the system response. In fact we were able to obtain the undamped oscillations and replicate the actual system response without resorting to the use of dynamic load models. With the "standard model" (the original WSCC model as described in the paper), the system was well damped. As the percentage of constant MVA load is increased, the system damping decreases drastically. Table 1 shows how the system damping changes in response to modelling modifications. Figure 2 shows the dramatic impact on system stability of modifications made to load only. Modeling for prime movers is quite optimistic, and affects damping estimates.
-t John Day Capacitor added
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Greater emphasis and resources should be given to -direct (measurement based) analysis.
-advanced analysis tools. With the arguable exception of HVDC effects, it appears that all of the modeling problems and repairs found by the authors are among those reported some years earlier by SOWG. The authors comments on this would be appreciated. SOWG advocated and, just a few years ago, drew upon a much richer technical infrastructure than most planners enjoy today. Prony analysis and the operating records that the authors use so extensively are both products of the SOWG effort. At BPA, support of SOWG model validation work was an important formal requirement in development of the monitor facilities that recorded the cascading outages of July 2 and August 10. Recommendations in 121 underlie most and perhaps all of the monitor projects in the WSCC. 
P. Donalek (Ham Engineering CO., Chicago, IL) :
Would the authors comment on the usefulness of the simulation models as a basis for a study of system stability aids? Specifically, could the model be used to make a study of the effectiveness of 8 proposed pumped storage hydro plant connected at the Captain Jack substation? It has been suggested that if the proposed pumped storage plant had been in operation and if the plant had adjustable speed machines, then it could have prevented the spread of the disturbance into the California system. For a description of this suggestion see "System Reliability Improvement with 10, 1996 WSCC system outage as a broader system phenomenon than a small signal stability problem. Although the instability was manifested in growing oscillations, the outage resulted from operating the power system under very stressed conditions with several transmission facilities out-of-service compounded by unforeseen factors. Pacific Northwest generation patterns have changed due to anadromous fish recovery programs limiting number of hydro generating units on the lower Columbia River. As the paper describes, power flows characterized by high generation on the upper Columbia River, and high imports from Canada lengthen the Northwest-California transmission path. Low generation in the lower Columbia reduces dynamic reactive power and inertial support for the ac and dc interties. The electrical center of the north-south oscillations also moves further north, closer to the Celilo HVDC terminal. With such generation pattern, the system is more susceptible to power oscillations. On August loth, outages of several 500-kV lines in the lower Columbia area and Keeler-Allston 500-kV line further increased the north-south angular separation and caused reactive power deficiency in the Northwest. The BPA-developed phase angle monitor indicated that the relative phase angle between the Grand Coulee and Malin 500kV busses increased from 59 degrees to 69 degrees following the Keeler-Alston 500kV line outage. The AGC action following McNary tripping spread the inter-area angle further. At that time, if not growing oscillations, insufficient synchronizing power or voltage collapse would likely have caused the system breakup; see SCADA recordings in Figure 5 . Other contributing factors were units operating on power factor control and operator intervention at a key unit to disable voltage control.
Our sensitivity studies clearly demonstrate that by reducing the north-south electrical distance (inserting series capacitors at Fort Rock) and providing additional reactive power support (shunt capacitors at Hanford and John Day) the August 10, 1996 outage could have been prevented. Other sensitivity studies demonstrate that had the McNary units not tripped, the system would have remained stable.
We agree that low-frequency oscillations in WSCC, 0 . 2 4 3 3 Hz Pacific intertie mode, should be addressed by proper tuning of power system stabilizers. This is further discussed in response to Dr. Hauer. We have been investig(3ting feasibility of reactive power modulation and switching to provide additional positive damping to the system. We designed and implemented AC -Voltage Dependent Current Order Limiter at Pacific HVDC Intertie to correct the PDCI dynamic response for low ac voltage conditions at Celilo. The new function is an emergency controller which releases reactive power from the converter when ac voltages are depressed and also can provide positive damping.
Negatively-damped oscillations can be created in a coniputer program in different ways. According to the discussors' reference, their load model in BC Hydro and the Northwest was changed to constant P and Q models to create negative damping without regard to actual estimated load composition and characteristics. Our purpose, however, was to realistically simulate the instability mechanisms. While we agree that load models have the most significant impact on the system damping, we do not think use of static load models (particularly constant power models) is the best approach. A good fit for a particular condition may not be a good fit for other conditions. The effect of dynamic loads on damping is known; see reference 7.
We investigated various load, characteristics and concluded that the most realistic load representation included dynamic representation of motor load. Saturday August loth was a very hot day through the western states and assumption of air-conditioning load, along with irrigation and other pumping load, is very reasonable. While more investigation is desirable, we see no reason not to model estimated motor load as aggregated dynamic devices.
We are convinced that the detailed HVDC model is essential for accurate reproduction and understanding of the event. Especially important is the multi-terminal representation of PDCI, and the control differences of the mercury-arc and thyristor converters. According to the discussors' reference, it was necessary, using their simplified single terminal HVDC model and controls, to raise the minimum firing angle from 5 to 9 degrees to somewhat approximate the PDCI behavior. Again, this is i i change to fit the system response that doesn't have a physical basis.
PDCI is a major transmission element in the WSCC system, transferring up to 3100MW of power, and its detailed representation is essential for the inter-area studies. Although reliability tends to be gradually neglected during extended periods without major outages, the stated policy is that reliability must not be compromised with restructuring (just as airline deregulation did not compromise safety). This will be difficult, but possible, in future power systems. Transmission companies, working together and with owners of other power system components, will bear primary responsibility.
New organizations such as security coordination centers, and new mandatory standards may help. Information technology to improve on-line security assessment is required Both the WSCC System Oscillations Work Group and the WSCC Modeling Work Group (groups now merged) provided recommendations that were approved, but not implemented. Modeling Work Group load modeling recommendations are similar to IEEEIPES recommendations [6].
We think the WSCC PSS tuning and operation practices are generally adequate. The main problem for Pacific Northwest units has been hardware-relatednoisy frequency transducers and old analog stabilizers. Newer accelerating power stabilizers are more effective. Upgrading of over 100 hydro units is costly and time consuming. Several large plants have dc commutator exciters that make PSS less effective.
Regarding further use of the detailed multi-terminal dc model, we will report results in future papers.
As far as on-line monitoring, the BPA has taken several significant steps in this direction. A reactive reserve monitor is implemented to alarm operators when reactive reserves at lower Columbia hydro plants are becoming too low. The BPA also designed and implemented a Phase Angle Monitor, which alarms a dispatcher when the phase angles between Coulee, John Day, and Malin are exceeding safe operating limits.
The BPA also initiated a probing signal project, when an operator can inject a step input in the PDCI current order to stimulate the ac system response. On-line analyzers will compute damping of power oscillations to ensure that the system has sufficient positive damping margin.
Response to Peter Donalek: The developed simulation model is being used for testing various stability aids such as supplementary controls applied to existing static var compensators, the Slatt thyristorcontrolled series capacitor, and switched shunt capacitors at Malin. Any device improving voltage support to California-Oregon Intertie, as suggested pump storage plant, should be beneficial for the system stability. Implementation and operational costs of any solution should be carefully evaluated.
In summary: The discussion and closure process adds to the value of the paper, and to the documentation of the power failure. Because of the importance of this outage to the power industry, we offer the following concluding comments.
The WSCC has made simultaneous transfer rating determination process much more rigorous. Season by season studies are made, with the challenge being development of more accurate and less manpower intensive on-line security assessment. Generator modeling is being improved by a WSCC-wide power plant testing program. Controls such as overexcitation limiters will be routinely modeled. Multi-terminal HVDC models will be used in future studies.
Challenges remain for the modeling of loads and prime mover controls.
Beyond the modeling, simulation and control desigdtuning issues, it's evident that many factors contributed to the severity of the August 10" failure. The many recommendations of reference 1 of the paper are being implemented.
Except for the July 2, 1996 event [SI, the undampednegatively damped intertie oscillations were the first observed since 1976 [9] -which was the last previous year with excellent hydroelectric generation conditions in the Pacific Northwest and British Columbia. The 1976 oscillations occurred during light load hours with high power transfers from Canada to California, and with low generation at lower Columbia River plants.
Following the instability, the cost of the breakup was greatly increased because a controlled separation scheme was out of service, and because of the undesirable tripping of generators in the southern islands despite adequate underfiequency load shedding. The WSCC has taken steps to restore use of the NE/SE Separation Scheme which islands the northern and southern parts of the WSCC grid for loss of the California Oregon Intertie, and enhance it with selective load tripping.
We conclude that defense-in-depth is essential to limit cascading and prevent rare combinations of factors from causing very costly power failures. The modeling issues discussed are critical elements in preventing future failures.
